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Abstract
Can neuroimaging methods offer any benefit to communication scholars? Although communication scholars
draw on multiple, interdisciplinary methods, the field has not traditionally leveraged neuroimaging techniques
(Cappella, 1996). By contrast, other social science disciplines have benefitted greatly from the use of
neuroscience methodologies to test core theoretical questions (Adolphs, 2003; Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000a;
Cacioppo, 2002; Cacioppo, Berntson, Sheridan, & McClintock, 2000; Lieberman, 2010; Loewenstein, Rick,
& Cohen, 2008; Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001; Poldrack, 2008; Sanfey, Loewenstein, & Mcclure, 2006;
Yarkoni, Poldrack, Van Essen, & Wager, 2010). The current chapter outlines a vision for how communication
studies might leverage neuroimaging technologies moving forward. We begin by defining communication
neuroscience as a subdiscipline and giving a brief overview of the most commonly employed neuroimaging
methods. We follow this introduction with a discussion of the types of questions that neuroimaging is most
equipped to answer and suggest areas for further exploration.
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CAN NEUROSCIENCE ADVANCE OUR
UNDERSTANDING OF CORE QUESTIONS
IN COMMUNICATION STUDIES?
AN OVERVIEW OF COMMUNICATION
NEUROSCIENCE
Emily B. Falk
Can neuroimaging methods offer any benefit to communication schol-
ars? Although communication scholars draw on multiple, interdisciplinary
methods, the field has not traditionally leveraged neuroimaging techniques
(Cappella, 1996). By contrast, other social science disciplines have benefit-
ted greatly from the use of neuroscience methodologies to test core theo-
retical questions (Adolphs, 2003; Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000a; Cacioppo,
2002; Cacioppo, Berntson, Sheridan, & McClintock, 2000; Lieberman,
2010; Loewenstein, Rick, & Cohen, 2008; Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001;
Poldrack, 2008; Sanfey, Loewenstein, & Mcclure, 2006; Yarkoni, Pol-
drack, Van Essen, & Wager, 2010). The current chapter outlines a vision
for how communication studies might Jeverage.neuroimagtiigtecfinoI9gi~S~.
ll\Ovirig"1()rWard~We begin by defining communication neuroscience as a
subdiscipline and giving a brief overview of the most commonly employed
neuroimaging methods. We follow this introduction with a discussion of
the types of questions that neuroimaging is most equipped to answer and
suggest areas for further exploration.
77
78 FAll<
WHAT IS COMMUNICATION NEUROSCIENCE?
Communication neuroscience uses neuroimaging tools to understand
s~ct~I.-communic<!~iqp-(e.g., interpersonal commnnicarrorrr-media-effects).
Neuroimaging has aided cognitive and social psychologists in beginning
to untangle and understand processes ranging from our ability to use
language (Bookheimer, 2002) to the nature of stereotypes and prejudice
(Amodio & Devine, 2006; Cunningham et ai., 2004; Cunningham &
Zelazo, 2007; Phelps, Cannisrraci, & Cunningham, 2003; Phelps et aI.,
2000; Phelps & Thomas, 2003). Communicatiopneuroscience provides a
p~,?lleLoppor.tunity, for communication scholars.inreresred in _u~nd-
ing health communicarion (Falk, 2010), political communication (Knutson,
WO,;o,'SPa'mpinato, & Grafman, 2006; Westen, 2007), jDti:rl1.~rsonaland
nonverbal communi.c;:ltion (Todorov, Baron, & Oosterhof, 2008; Todorov,
Gobbini, Evans, & Haxby, 2007; Willis & Todorov, 2006), and those
interested in understanding media effects (Marhiak & Weber, 2006; Wag-
ner, Dal Cin, Sargent, Kelley, & Heatherton, 2011; Weber, Ritterfeld, &
Marhiak, 2006).
WHAT METHODS ARE AVAILABLE?'·2
Neuroimaging tools are becoming increasingly available and affordable.
Currently, severar-rilethods-fxist- thatU allow scientists to record neural
activity, in real time, while participants are exposed to stimuli or perform
specific tasks. Event-related potentials (ERPs), electroencephalography
(EEG), functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS), positron emission
ti::imcigrapny-(PET/;'and'functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) are
some of the most common methods used. Each of these tools has rela-
tive advantages and disadvantages; for example, among the least invasive
methods, EEG and ERPs allow extremely high temporal resolution (milli-
seconds), whereas fMRI provides better spatial resolution and whole brain
tA complete discussion of available methods is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Interested readers are referred to Methods ill Social Neuroscience (Harmon-Jones
& Beer,2009).
"The focus of the current chapter is neuroimaging methods. However, other tools,
including those used for psychophysiological measurement (see Cacioppo & Ber-
ntson, 1992; Lang, Potter, & Bolls, 2009; Potter & Bolls, 2011), and other bio-
logically oriented tools (see Bailenson, Chapter 8, this volume; Johnson, Chapter
6, this volume) offer complementary advantages.
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coverage. Functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) is an increasingly
popular method due to its relatively lower cost and portability. fNIRS
provides a means to test larger samples in more naturalistic environments,
with relatively good spatial and temporal resolution; however, it is limited
to examining processes that take place near the cortical surface. Detailed
treatment of the methodological considerations arising from the use of
neuroimaging methods are beyond the scope of this chapter; however,
readers interested in a basic understanding of the process of conduct-
ing neuroscience research are referred to Harmon-Jones and Beer (2009).
Researchers interested in more detailed treatment of the limitations of
neuroimaging methods are referred to Aue, Lavelle, and Cacioppo (2009),
Lane and Wager (2009), and Poldrack (2006). Collaborations between
neuroscientists and communication scholars can provide an efficient and
fruitful way to study theoretically substantive questions while maintaining
high methodological standards.
WHAT TYPES OF QUESTIONS CAN
NEUROIMAGING METHODS INFORM?
Integration of neuroimaging.merhodswith methods ..more commonly used
in commun-ic~tfon- studies (e.g., su~~~ys~·'c;'·~t~nt¥analysi~:~focus groups,
experi~et1ts)canIn-for·ni-~oE).f!l_~~_~c~!L~~_theory; provide practical i~~~g~~,.
~t med~'Lef[e~ls,_ana_aid.llellroscientists. in understanding. the brain.
As a starting point, a number of psychological processes have beenchar-
acterized in terms of the neural activity that they elicit.' Of particular
relevance to understanding social communication, neural systems involved
in different types of emotional/affective processing, reasoning, attention,
memory formation and retrieval, social cognition and perspective taking,
and self-related processes, among others, have been mapped in the brain
(Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000a, 2000b; Cacioppo, 2002; Cacioppo et aI.,
2000; Lieberman, 2010).
The ability to monitor and record neural activity throughout the brain
opens the potential for communicationscholars .to test .competing hypoth-;
~ln-- particu13:r,neuroirnaging may be of use in distinguishing processes
that appear to be similar on the surface but are actually supported by
'Studies that treat neural activity as a dependent variable (examining where a
process takes place in the brain) are typically referred to as "Brain Mapping"
studies. Although this type of research is highly useful and necessary, communica-
tion scholars are likely to benefit most from leveraging brain mapping that has
already occurred to test specific hypotheses of interest.
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distinct underlying mechanisms. For example, different neural mechanisms
are recruited when ascribing beliefs to political candidates 5 weeks com-
pared with 5 days prior to a presidential election despite equivalent self-
reports (Falk, Spunt, & Lieberman, in press). Conversely, lteJ!Lqj~ng
can also. provjde..evidence for theories that suggest common undeiliing
;n;echanismdor processes that appear ~distinct o~' th~·;u~fa~~ . (Amodio,
2010a; Lieberman, 2010). For example, neural systems involved in process-
ing the discomfort of physical pain overlap with the neural systems brought
online when a person experiences social exclusion (Eisenberger, Lieberman,
& Williams, 2003; Kross, Berman, Mischel, Smith, & Wager, 2011).
Finally, given that neuroimaging methods tap into processes that are
introspectively opaque or otherwise difficult to capture through self-report
(Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1998), neuroimaging may allow us t'U?redict
outcomes that are difficult to predict when relying·.o!'_.s.eif-r~porLakll!e
(Falk, 2010; Falk, Berkman, Mann, Harrisoii,'8i:-Lieberman, 2010; Falk,
Berkman, Whalen, & Lieberman, 2011). For example, neural signals in
hypothesized regions of interest predict an additional -20% of the vari-
ance in health behavior change following persuasive messages, above and
beyond self-report measures such as attitudes, intentions, and self-efficacy
(Falk et aI., 2010, 2011).
QUESTIONS OF IMPORTANCE
TO COMMUNICATION STUDIES
The following list of open questions is by no means exhaustive. Instead,
it is meant to pique the interest of communication scholars and to sug-
gest example ways in which neuroimaging methods might address relevant
questions to our field.
Minority Portrayills. in theMedia. One of the earliest topics addressed
by soCiaTn~ur~~~-i~~tistsusing neuroimaging techniques concerned neural
responses to outgroups (Phelps et aI., 2000; Phelps & Thomas, 2003).
Building on this early research, investigations of stereotyping, prejudice,
and representation of explicit and implicit attitudes in the brain have
proliferated (Amodio, 2008, 2010b; Amodio & Devine, 2006; Amodio,
Harmon-Jones, & Devine, 2003; Amodio, Kubota, Harmon-Jones, &
Devine, 2006; Cunningham, Espinet, Deyoung, & Zelazo, 2005; Cun-
ningham et al., 2004; Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2004; Cunning-
ham & Zelazo, 2007; Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, & Van Bavel, 2007;
Richeson et aI., 2003). Self-report data are notoriously inaccurate when
referencing socially charged topics (because of self-presentation concerns,
demand characteristics, etc.). In these situations,.iLis_commonto find-dis-
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crepancy be~e~n.~ml'licit_mea~ures.a!l9_expJicit-self:rep-ons,JJlLeXa'!1P1",
participantsare loath to giveresponses .t!t~t might reveal.racial.prejudice
or animus. Given this type of concern, investigators interested in the
influence uf minoriry portrayals in the media may benefit by integrating
neural measures into their repertoire/toolkit.
_Persuasion.and.Attitude, Change •.Preliminary work exploring the neu-
ral bases of persuasion suggests that, under many _circumstances,_ neu-
D!Lsl'stems-involved in self-processes.and social cognition 'are _c~;;:tfaCio-:--
~u.asi(ln. (Chua, Liberzon, Welsh, & Strecher, 2009; Falk, Berkman et
aI., 2010; Falk er al., 2011; Falk et aI., 2010; d. Klucharev, Smidts, &
Fernandez, 2008). Additional research is needed to broaden our under-
standing of the boundary conditions on these effects and to link classic
theories such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo,
1986) and the Heuristic Systematic Model (Eagly & Chaiken, 2005) to
observed neural activity in response to persuasive messages .
.Behavior Change and Neural Focus Groups. In addition tobrain map-
ping studies examining. neuralcorrelates of persuasion processes.crecent.c,
work has also demonstrated that !,e~r.aLsigl}al~.S~I1_predictvariability. in.
behavior change following exposureto .persuasive. messages.that isnot ..
~pl"il1edJ)y:self-report measures such. as. attitudes, intentions and self-
efficacy (Falk, Berkman et aI., 2010; Falk et aI., 2011). In particular, our
lab seeks to link neural responses in small groups of individuals (as with a
traditional focus group) to the effects of media on a larger scale. This tech-
nique is known as "neural focus grouping." The broader concept of using
neural acriviry to predict real-world outcomes is the "brain-as-predictor"
approach to distinguish it from research on brain mapping (in which
neural activity is treated as an outcome variable). Preliminary research
suggests that neural signals that predict individual behavior change can
also be used to predict population level media effects (Berns & Moore,
in press; Falk, Berkman, & Lieberman, in press).
_A"ton,aticity and Control in Media Choice and Consumption. One
important assumption in many theories of communication -is tharof an
active audience. For example, the. uses and gratificationsperspective (Katz,
BlUililer;&-G~revitch, 1974) suggests that porennajuudiencerncmbcrs.
make choices to satisfy individual preferences or needs. These preferences
andneeds't!lu'ssl1ape potential media effects, but the motivations/needsl
gratifications driving specific choices may be unconscious and difficult to
capture through self-report. Neuroimaging is ideally positioned to aid in
our understanding of the processesunaedying ~niedia ch6ice,.consump-
tIotl,'aild·°S;;f£:regulation with respect to .choice ..and consumption.Jsec
Hare;- Malmaud, & Rangel, 2011, for an example where neuroimag-
ing informs similar processes in the context of food consumption). Of
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particular interest, neuroimaging research has characterized brain systems
that tend to be involved in automatic, affective processes versus those that
tend to be more involved in deliberative, cognitive reasoning (Satpute &
Lieberman, 2006). Assessing the neural systems that are brought online
when individuals make choices regarding the types of media to consume
under different circumstances (e.g., under cognitive load vs, not under
load; in the immediate vs. in the future) could provide insight about how
and why we consume media, as well as the self-regulatory processes that
direct our choices under different circumstances (Panek, 2011).
Affect Versus Cognition. The distinction between affective and cogni-
tive processing parallels the distinction .berween automatic and controlled
I;rocesses in many ways(Chaiken & Trope, 1999). Similarly, to the extent
-rhat 'neuroimaging has been able to characterize distinctions in affective
versus cognitive processing in the human brain, this knowledge can aid in
testing hypotheses about the balance of these processes in specific contexts
(Satpute & Lieberman, 2006). Furthermore, to the extent that we are able
to distinguish between different types of affective and cognitive processes
(e.g., fear vs. anger vs. disgust; response inhibition vs. attention redirection),
finer grained hypotheses can be tested. These distinctions may be especially
relevant to questions in health communication and to questions of political
communication and political action; for example, do neural processes under-
lying different negative emotions (e.g., fear, anger, disgust) predict support
for conservative immigration policies? Does the same neural activity (or dif-
ferent neural activity) predict support for action against outgroups (e.g., by
deputizing police, authorizing more violent action)? For example, prior work
in this area has examined motivated reasoning when assessing the actions
of political candidates (Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & Hamann, 2006).
These distinctions may also be useful in addressing debates surround-
ingaggcessionand_the_.effects of media violence (Bartholow, Bushman, &
Sestir, 2006; Denson, 2011; Eisenberger, -·Way,Taylor. WelCli;-lX"tieber-
man, 2007; Mathiak & Weber, 2006; Weber, Ritterfeld, & Mathiak,
2006); for example, does neural sensitivityto threat cues incoreaffective
processing regions predict aggressive behavior in experimental settings?
To what extent can activity in cognitive control regions override such
pre-potent impulses? Do these patterns of neural activity likewise predict
aggression in the real world? Aggression researchers have proposed stimuli
that act as inhibitory and disinhibitory cues to aggression and violence
(Huesmann, 1986). Neuroimaging can help explain the balance among
affective responding, cognitive control, and the relationships of each to
aggressive behavior. Researchers have only begun applying neuroimaging
research to this area, and there is considerably more to learn.
Understanding Emotions. Beyond distinguishing between affective
and cognitive processes, the brain may also lend insight into the basic
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mechanisms underlying emotion (Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau,
& Barrett, in press); in fact, affective neuroscience is an entire subdis-
cipline. In this domain, communication scholars have much to offer. In
order to study affective processing mechanisms, neuroscientists need to
effectively elicit powerful emotions in a laboratory environment. Finding
appropriate stimuli can be a difficult task. In this area, communication
scholars have much to contribute. We can develop stimuli that effectively
elicit powerful emotions. Likewise, communication scholars have invested
considerable effort in understanding these emotions, as well as why we
seek out particular types of media and their corresponding emotional
experiences (Bryant & Oliver, 2009; Katz, Blumler, & Gurevitch, 1973;
Oliver & Bartsch, 2010). Investigation of media effects in the brain, with
a focus on different types of emotional engagement and response, stands
to inform our understanding of both the brain and human experience in
relation to theories of communication.
Finally, there is strong evidence that labeling emotions (as necessary
with many self-report "measU"res)serves--;' regulatory pw:pose":CCreswelC""
Way, Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 2007; Lieberman et aI., 2007), and the
experience of emotion is altered by introspection and verbal.or written.
lalJeling::·i\s"wirh- other biological response measures (e.g. Cacioppo &
Berntson~1992; Lang, Potter, & Bolls, 2009; Potter & Bolls, 2011), neuro-
imaging methods allow signal capture in the absence of self-report and can
aid in our understanding of basic media effects with respect to emotion.
Priming Effects" Priming effects are likely to intersect wirhmany.of
the-concepts listedearl;er (effects of emotion on political decision mak-
ing, violence and aggression following exposure to violence in the media,
multiple basic persuasion processes, basic emotional responses to media),
Existing-'!.eJ'xgimaging.research takes. advantage of priming techniques in
__uiienm~ntaLdesigns. (Amodio, Harmon-Jones, Devine, & Curtin, 2004)
as well as helping to further deveiQ~g gur understanding pi.Q,,-'" "prim,.
ing works and why (Moore et aI., 2009) .
....J2iff..us;o,,_o{i,,;,_oyatifms.Social communication caralyzes jhe spread
of values, attitudes, and behaviors. Current work in our. Jab explores
meneuralresponse to ideai~that are destined to spread successfully (a
meme effect), as well as neural activity predicting individual intentions
to spread ideas and success in doing so (an idea salesperson effect). Cur-
rent results emphasize three neural systems (involved in social thinking!
perspective taking and self-related processes, and reward/valuation) that
predict distinct components of these three effects (the meme effect, the
intention effect, the salesperson effect); in particular, our results are con-
sistent with the hypothesis that in the initial process of taking in informa-
tion, people may consider the social currency of being the person who
spreads a particular bit of information and plan for ways to successfully
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share the information with others accordingly. Being seen as the source
of good ideas (regardless of whether the ideas are one's own) has always
had great social value, and new media outlets have made this process
even more visible and explicit. This line of research stands to inform our
ability to construct more compelling, "stickier" messages and identify the
mechanisms that lead individuals to be better messengers. Ultimately, this
work may also help us understand how our ability to spread information
relates to our social identity, builds social status, and strengthens our
social ties, in addition to helping to uncover the basic mechanisms that
lead to the diffusion of ideas and innovations.
, Communication~n-,,-Global Society. The .mass media bavea.global
reach, with new technologies increasingly connecting individualsaround
tlieworld.-lri the'global media environment, and with increasing need
for cross-cultural communication at the individual level (e.g., in busi-
ness, through social media), questions of how people from different back'
grounds process information become increasingly important. The- nascent
field 'of cultural neuroscience has provided baseline assessments <£i1eural
siiiiilarities and .differences in basic cognitive processea.acrosscultures
(Chiao & Ambady, 2007; Kitayama & Park, 2010). In collaboration with
cultural neuroscientists, communications scholars may find it useful to
harri'ess neuroimaging methods to address questions of how. culture.vand
media exposure. in particular, shapes neural systems and how_ similarities
'!!!-ddifferencesjn -,he functions adopted by diffe~~El~_'.!"..ur,,-1systems go
on to influence the way that information is processed, synthesized, and
interpreted, both within and across cultural boundaries .
•Attention and Switch Tasking; Multitasking ..and.Lnformation, Syn-
thesis. In an increasingly complex media environment, how is attention
directed and captured? Concern abounds that youth raised in rhecurrent
media environment will be unableto focus on scholarship ancLmeaningful
social relationships and will become less civically engaged. It is widely
speculated that today's youth will rely more and more heavily on multi-
tasking/switch-tasking, and that this pattern will have detrimental effects
on learning and information synthesis. Significant bodies of literature exist
addressing the neural systems involved in attention capture":di~ect-ionand
focus, as well as neural systems implicated in information-sy~thesisand
learning (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000a). Current evidence suggests detrimen-
tal effects of switch-tasking on learning and information synthesis (Foerde,
Knowlton;-&-Poldrick, 2006; Foerde, Poldrack,'& Knowlton, 2007). It
is possible that these effects are universal and represent significant cause
for concern moving forward. The brain is extremely adaptable, however,
and there is some possibility that rising generations will develop ways of
processing information to conform to the surrounding environment. Lon-
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gitudinal studies combining neural measures with behavioral performance
measures stand to inform our understanding of multitasking, how. people.
interact w;t!L.thl:.new_me.dia. enyjronmentc.and.how-the- brain- ada pts-to
capitalize on environmental and situational £~n_~~~~int~':ULd.~ppportlJnj!i~_s..__
Ulstmctions Between lfealiiY ana the' World Portrayed by the Media._
Cult;va;;;n-theory(Getb-;'~r, Gros~,' Morgan, &" Sign"rieili, 1994') sug-
gests that our attitudes and beliefs about the world are influenced by the
world as portrayed by the media. The proposed process is cumulative
across time, and the psychological mechanisms underlying this evolution
are likely to elude self-report (e.g., to what extent are popular media
portrayals of the world encoded in the same way as "real" events?). As
noted by Cappella (1996): "One place to start is with the assumption of
a brain specialized to process physical reality, not mediated information.
A>..me.dja_e.vnl>'e...technalogically,...answerin~queries..about .theirpossible
elfects require~~~E~!:1_I!.~_c;~~ndingof the mental processesand _st!_l1~~u.~e~
that constrain audience responses. Part of understanding how texts work,
then, is understanding 'the media that hold them and the neural struc-
tures that must respond to them" (p. 6). Neuroimaging could be used
to examine whether similar or distinct neural systems are recruited when
individuals encode story lines attributed to soap operas versus the news
media versus information from a trusted friend or family member. It may
also be of interest to compare the neural systems recruited in each of these
cases to the neural systems recruited when processing storylines attributed
to reality television showsJ".e!!r~tsignals prese.!'t during encoding in each
of these conditions might also predict the. extent. to, which beliefs about
tne'worl,!"change 'to conform to the world as portrayed by the media.
--Presence''--X'-'ieIated set"'of qucstionsconcems presence, or the "psy-
chological state in.",hich, virtual objects areexperienced .. s actual objects., ..
in either sensory or nonsens!'ry ways" (Lee, 2004). In summarizing the
·literaiUreOrlpreSe;;;,~, Lee (2004) argues for a unified term encompassing
telepresence, virtual presence, mediated presence, co·presence, and presence.
Neuroimaging can be of use in addressing the theoretical question of defining.
subsets of presence..In-j3;,itlculat,neuroiniagingcan tell"us which experiences, .
the brain codes as similar and to what extent the brain differentiates them,'
4While distinguishing among physical presence, social presence, and self presence,
Lee (2004) argues that "technology-specific differentiation of presence (telepresence
vs. virtual presence) is meaningless, because presence, by definition, is not about
characteristics of the technology-it is a psychological construct dealing with the
perceptual process of technology-generated stimuli" {p. 30). As such, under this
typology, video conferencing, seeing a person on television, and seeing a photo-
graphic image of someone are all categorized as para-authentic social experiences.
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As a starting point, we might compare neural responses to known
others over virtual connections (e.g., a conversation with a friend over a
mobile phone, social networking site, instant messaging, or teleconferencing)
versus live interactions with the same individuals (as in face-to-face interac-
tion). Neuroimaging was used to resolve a similar early debate in cognitive
psychology concerning the role of visual simulation in mental imagery.
Specifically, does mental imagery rely on depictive representations or purely
propositional representations? By demonstrating that mental imagery relies
on similar neural systems to actual primary visual perception, Kosslyn and
others were able to make a more convincing argument for depictive rep-
resentations in mental imagery (Behrmann, Kosslyn, & Jeannerod, 1995;
Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006). A parallel argument could be made
in determining the extent to which virtual communication is processed
similarly to face-to-face interaction.
We might then move to investigation of interactions between the
medium of experience and the players involved (in what ways is inter-
acting with a partner, friend, family member, acquaintance, or stranger
similar or different [from a brain perspective] depending on an in-person
vs, virtual context). A combination of higher resolution imaging modali-
ties (e.g., fMRI) with imaging modalities that allow for more naturalistic
environments (such as EEG and fNIRS) may be best suited to address
such questions because all interactions in the fMRI environment are in
some ways virtual (given the constraints of the method and scanner space).
Similarly, we might explore the extent to which parasocial relationships
between media consumers and media personalities, between individuals
in virtual environments (e.g., avatar-based interactions), and experience
in the real world are represented similarly or differentially in the brain.
It might also be of interest to compare the brain's representation
of parasocial relationships to real-world relationships. Given that media
personalities can feel like close friends (e.g., Princess Diana, favorite char-
acters on fictional shows), a natural question might be the extent to which
the neural systems recruited when observing and considering the actions of
media characters are similar or distinct from the neural systems recruited
when observing and considering the actions of friends, acquaintances,
and the self in the real world (to what extent does the brain treat these
figures as it treats real friends? to what extent does it flag parasocial
relationships as different?).
We might hypothesize different consequences of overlapping neural
representations of fictional and real social ties; for example, neuroimag-
ing research has demonstrated that (a) physical pain and social exclusion!
rejection share common neural underpinnings (Eisenberger, jarcho, Lieber-
man, & Naliboff, 2006; Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004; Eisenberger et
aI., 2003), (b) empathy for the pain of others is also partly represented
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in these circuits (Masten, Eisenberger, & Borofsky, 2009; Masten, Eisen-
berger, Pfeifer, & Dapretto, 2010; Masten, Morelli, & Eisenberger, 2011).
Do we represent the social pain of virtual characters' losses in the same
way that we represent our own social pain and that of those closest to us?
Finally, res~aIclJ_i!1JociaL. neuroscience.. demonstrates, that .rhinking
about personalattrjbutes of close others and thinking about.the.self recruit
overlapping neural regig!,s, whereas thinking about more distant others
and those who are different from us recruit distinct neural regions from
self-related processing.' These lines of research have not explicitly consid-
ered the role of real versus mediated relationships within this framework,
nor has the possibility of multiple selves (as is possible to create in virtual
environments, e.g., through avatars) been considered in this context. It may
be of interest to study neural representations of the self in virtual worlds
as compared to the self in the real world. Individual differences in the neu-
ral representations of the self in mediated contexts (e.g., through avatars)
might also predict individual differences in behavior change following inter-
ventions employing these technologies (Fox & Bailenson, 2010). Finally,
just as with any social psychological phenomenon, we might hypothesize
variables that would moderate these relationships (including transporta-
tion, engagement with a television series, perception of events on television
as being more closely aligned with reality, and culture).
CL.OSING THOUGHTS
The list of questions and areas for exploration suggested in this chapter
is by no means exhaustive. Instead, this list ismeant to provide.example
stafting pomts for future ·research, to spur brainstorming, and to highlight
areas of potential fruitful collaboration between communication scholars
and neuroscientists. Taking a step back, as we consider what the neuro-
science literature has to offer our theory and practice, and as we con-
sider incorporating neuroimaging methods into our own work, the same
principles that guide sound behavioral research apply. We must be cau-
tious in our use of causal language; a combination of sound experimental
design and incorporation of neuroimaging measures into longitudinal stud-
ies will facilitate better evaluation and use of the predictive capacity of
neuroscience methods. In many cases, we still need to clarify the neural
'Interestingly, this finding is moderated by culture. Those raised in more collectivist
(East Asian) societies tend to show even greater increased overlap between self
and close others as compared with those raised in individualist (Western/Ameti-
can) society. It is possible that the relationship between viewers and characters
also varies by culture.
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mechanisms associated with observed effects (in a brain mapping step)
before we will be able to develop predictive models to explain variance
that is not currently explained by other measures (i.e., self-report and
implicit measures). A separate step is also needed if we want to con-
nect neural responses at the individual level to behavior responses at the
population level (see neural focus groups). Longitudinal studies will also
help to bridge the gap between the relatively foreign neuroscience labora-
tory environment and real-world experience. The communication neuro-
science framework, emphasizes" interdisciplinary' 'collaboration:in·an..effort
t.o" maximizetheoretical _releyance~_innovation, ..and practical ..applicarjpn.
Communication scholars and neuroscientists alike will benefit by taking
advantage of the expertise that ~ach has to offer. ,,-
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